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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3534 
___________ 
 
RONALD IAN BOATWRIGHT, 
              Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN FAIRTON FCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. No. 1-17-cv-04220) 
District Judge:  Honorable Renée Marie Bumb 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 27, 2018 
 
Before:  VANASKIE, COWEN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 31, 2018) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Ronald Ian Boatwright appeals from the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition that  
he filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  We will affirm. 
 
I. 
In 2012, Boatwright pleaded guilty in the Middle District of Pennsylvania to one 
count of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  The 
parties stipulated to a sentencing range of 100 to 120 months in prison under Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C).  Boatwright’s Presentence Report later deemed him a career 
offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) because he had been convicted of two prior felony 
controlled substance offenses under 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30).  With the career-
offender enhancement, Boatwright’s Guidelines range was 168-210 months.  Without it, 
his range would have been 92-115 months.  The District Court sentenced Boatwright to 
110 months, which was the middle of the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentencing range.  Boatwright 
did not file a direct appeal, and he has never filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
 In 2017, Boatwright instituted the proceeding at issue here by filing pro se a § 
2241 habeas petition in the District of New Jersey, which is his district of confinement.  
Boatwright claimed that, under the categorical approach as applied in Mathis v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), his prior convictions no longer qualify as predicate 
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controlled substance offenses and he no longer is a career offender.  The District Court 
dismissed Boatwright’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.  He appeals pro se.1  
II. 
 The District Court concluded that Boatwright could not proceed under § 2241 
because (1) he could have asserted his Mathis claim in an initial motion under § 2255, 
and (2) career-offender enhancements cannot be challenged under § 2241.  We have not 
decided the second issue, see United States v. Doe, 810 F.3d 132, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2015), 
and we need not do so in this case because we agree with the District Court on the first. 
 Federal prisoners generally may collaterally challenge their sentences only by 
filing a § 2255 motion with their sentencing court.  See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 178.  If the § 
2255 remedy is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [their] detention,” 
however, then federal prisoners may collaterally challenge their sentences under § 2241 
in their district of confinement.  Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)).  We thus far have 
recognized only one narrow circumstance in which the § 2255 remedy is inadequate or 
ineffective.  See id. at 179 (discussing In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
In Dorsainvil, after the petitioner already had filed an unsuccessful § 2255 motion, 
the United States Supreme Court interpreted his statute of conviction in Bailey v. United 
States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), in a way that rendered his conduct non-criminal.  The 
petitioner could not seek relief in another § 2255 motion because successive § 2255 
                                              
1 Federal prisoners do not require a certificate of appealability to appeal from the denial 
of a § 2241 petition.  See Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 
2017).  Thus, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. 
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motions based on new law must be based on new rules of constitutional law and Bailey 
involved statutory construction rather than constitutional law.  See Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 
at 247-48.  The petitioner also had no prior opportunity to raise his challenge in an initial 
§ 2255 motion because Bailey was decided after his § 2255 proceeding was complete.  
See id. at 246, 251.  In that “unusual circumstance,” we concluded, the § 2255 remedy 
was inadequate and the petitioner could proceed under § 2241.  Id. at 251.   
Boatwright recognizes that the restrictions on filing successive § 2255 motions at 
issue in Dorsainvil do not apply to him because he has never filed a first § 2255 motion.  
He nevertheless argues that Dorsainvil allows him to proceed under § 2241 because a § 
2255 motion would be barred by a different procedural obstacle—the statute of 
limitations.  Section 2255 motions generally must be filed within one year of the date on 
which the conviction becomes final.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1).  If Boatwright had filed 
a § 2255 motion rather than a § 2241 petition, it would indeed have been untimely under 
that provision.   
As the District Court noted, however, § 2255 contains an alternate commencement 
date for the one-year statute of limitations running from “the date on which the right 
asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly 
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable on collateral 
review.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).  Unlike new rules permitting successive § 2255 
motions, new “rights” triggering § 2255(f)(3) need not be constitutional.  See United 
States v. Lloyd, 188 F.3d 184, 187 n.8 (3d Cir. 1999), abrogated in part on other grounds 
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by Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005).2  Thus, if Mathis recognized a new 
right for purposes of § 2255(f)(3), then Boatwright’s petition would be timely if brought 
as a § 2255 motion because he filed it within one year of the date Mathis was decided. 
The parties agree that Boatwright’s petition is untimely under this provision, and 
that he cannot proceed under § 2255, because Mathis is not “new.”  Every Court of 
Appeals to have addressed Mathis in this context or the context of successiveness—
which requires a “new rule,” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2)—has so concluded.  See, e.g., 
Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232, 237 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. denied, No. 17-1251, 
2018 WL 1243146 (U.S. June 25, 2018); In re Conzelmann, 872 F.3d 375, 376-77 (6th 
Cir. 2017) (collecting cases).  Other courts have concluded that Mathis’s immediate 
predecessor, Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013), is not “new” for purposes 
of § 2255(f)(3) either.  See, e.g., Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1219-20 (11th 
Cir. 2017); United States v. Morgan, 845 F.3d 664, 666-67 (5th Cir. 2017) (collecting 
cases).  Their reasoning would appear to apply with equal force to Mathis as well.   
We have not decided whether Mathis recognized a new right for purposes of § 
2255(f)(3), but we need not do so to conclude that Boatwright cannot resort to § 2241.  If 
Mathis is new, then Boatwright could have timely asserted his claim in a § 2255 motion 
and was required to use that “preferred vehicle” regardless of whether his claim could 
otherwise be brought under § 2241.  Lloyd, 188 F.3d at 187 n.9.  If Mathis is not new, by 
                                              
2 Dodd holds that, under § 2255(f)(3), the statute of limitations runs from the date on 
which the Supreme Court newly recognizes a right rather than the date on which that 
right is made retroactive.  Lloyd held otherwise, and Dodd abrogates it to that extent.   
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contrast, then Boatwright could have raised his claim in a timely § 2255 motion before.3  
Either way, there is no basis to permit him to proceed under § 2241. 
Thus, the District Court correctly denied Boatwright resort to that provision.  The 
District Court did not address the possibility of transferring his petition to his sentencing 
court for treatment as a § 2255 motion in order to preserve its filing date for statute of 
limitations purposes.  We decline to order the District Court to transfer it because, among 
other things, Boatwright has taken the position that his petition is untimely under § 2255 
and he chose not to attempt to proceed thereunder.   
Nevertheless, our ruling is without prejudice to Boatwright’s ability to file a 
motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) with the District Court requesting that it transfer his 
petition to his sentencing court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.  We express no opinion on 
whether a transfer would be warranted or on whether Boatwright’s petition would be 
timely if treated as a § 2255 motion.  Boatwright is advised that treatment of his petition 
as a § 2255 motion would trigger the restrictions on filing second or successive § 2255 
motions contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).  See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 
383 (2003); United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1999).   
 
 
                                              
3 If Mathis is not new, then it would be because Boatwright’s challenge was available at 
least by the time the Supreme Court decided Descamps on June 20, 2013.  His conviction 
became final about six months before that on January 13, 2013.  Thus, Boatwright would 
have had approximately six months to raise a claim under Descamps that would have 
been timely as measured from the date of his conviction, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), 
regardless of whether Descamps itself was “new.” 
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III. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.4 
                                              
4 In light of our disposition, we need not reach the Government’s other arguments for 
affirmance.  We nevertheless briefly note why we reject one of them.  The Government 
argues that Boatwright’s Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea precludes relief even if his career-
offender designation is invalid under Mathis because subsequent legal developments do 
not undermine the validity of a plea.  See United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 213 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  That point is not dispositive because Boatwright does not require relief from 
his plea in order to obtain meaningful relief.  Boatwright stipulated to a sentence of 100 
to 120 months of imprisonment, and his sentencing court imposed a sentence of 110 
months.  If the sentencing court were to conclude that Boatwright’s career-offender 
designation is invalid, then that conclusion could lead it to impose a lower sentence 
within the same range.  Such a sentence would remain consistent with the parties’ 
agreement and would not require rejection of the plea.   
 
The Government also initially argued, by analogy to motions for sentence 
reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), that relief from Boatwright’s career-offender 
designation would not affect his sentence because his sentenced was based, not on the 
Guidelines, but on his Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea.  The Government later filed a letter under 
Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) appearing to abandon that theory in light of Hughes v. United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018).  In any event, we need not address it.   
